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INCOME TAX REFUND OFFSET
Creditor/Debtor Law-COLLECTING DEFAULTED STUDENT LOANS: IN-
COME TAX REFUND OFFSET-Thomas v. Bennett, 856 F.2d 1165 (8th
Cir. 1988)
INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Education has intercepted mil-
lions of dollars in tax refunds from thousands of people who have
defaulted on their federally guaranteed student loans.' This inter-
ception of tax refunds was initiated largely because the costs to the
federal government of defaulted student loans began to escalate dur-
ing the mid-1970s. These costs increased primarily for two reasons. 2
First, the large number of student borrowers from the late 1960s and
early 1970s moved into repayment status. 3 In 1970, the amount of
loans due to be repaid was less than $500 million.4 By 1974, this
figure had risen to about $2.5 billion.5 Second, the percentage of
borrowers who defaulted on their student loan repayments began to
increase.6 This increasing default rate was aggravated by the federal
government's lack of collection efforts.7
Moreover, the tremendous increases in educational costs and the
troubled economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s have forced
more and more students to rely upon federally guaranteed student
loans to finance their educations. 8 The Guaranteed Student Loan
1. See Rigg, Intercept of Tax Refunds to Offset Debts Owed Federal Agencies: Part I, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 557, 557 (1986) [hereinafter Rigg I]. The Department of Edu-
cation recovered $116 million owed the federal government by student loan default-
ers by intercepting the defaulters' 1985 income tax refunds. Hanlon, Tax Refund
Intercepts From Loan Defaulters Pay Off for Federal Government, 31 TAX NOTES 971, 971
(1986). In the first five months of 1985, U.S. attorneys' offices around the country
had filed claims against more than 15,000 students. Blodgett, Pay It Back, 71 A.B.A.
J. 22, 22 (May 1985).
2. NATIONAL COMM'N ON STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE, GUARANTEED STUDENT
LOANS: A BACKGROUND PAPER 23 (1982) [hereinafter BACKGROUND PAPER](federal
government spends money to collect defaulted loans and it is obligated to reimburse
lenders for outstanding principal and interest on the loans).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The initial alarm sounded when the default rate increased to twelve per-
cent in the mid-1970s. Id.
7. Id.
8. Naegele, The Guaranteed Student Loan Program: Do Lenders' Risks Exceed Their Re-
wards? 34 HASTINGS L.J. 599, 601 (1983). As of 1978, over forty percent of all Ameri-
can law schools' gross tuition income was derived from student loans. Swords and
Walwer, Financing Legal Education, 64 A.B.A. J. 1880, 1885 (1978).
"The federal [government's] role as a provider of student assistance began with
the GI Bill after World War II." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL STUDENT
ASSISTANCE: ISSUES & OPrIONS 1 (1981) [hereinafter FEDERAL STUDENT ASSISTANCE].
The government expanded this assistance by providing student loans under the Na-
tional Defense Eduction Act passed in 1958. Id. Congress then passed the Higher
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(GSL) Program9 has become not just a convenience for a small
number of students, but an absolute necessity for many students. 10
In addition, the GSL program has developed into one of the most
important sources of tuition money for schools throughout the coun-
try."I This growth of the GSL Program coupled with the increasing
number of student loan defaulters forced the government, in the
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1060-98 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). This Act authorizes the Department of
Education to administer several student loan programs. Among these are the Fed-
eral Insured Student Loan Program, the Guaranteed Student Loan Program (now
called the Robert T. Stafford Student Loan Program, see infra note 9), and the Na-
tional Direct Student Loan Program. Rigg I, supra note 1, at 560. This Act was estab-
lished in response to a concern that minority and lower-income students had much
lower rates of college attendance. FEDERAL STUDENT ASSISTANCE, supra, at 1. After a
few years, Congress expanded the scope of its student assistance by passing the Mid-
dle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978. This expansion in student assistance
naturally led to tremendous increases in costs to the federal government. Id.
9. The Guaranteed Student Loan Program is authorized under the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1965. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1060-98 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). In 1988,
the Higher Education Act of 1965 was amended and the GSL Program was renamed
the Robert T. Stafford Student Loan Program. Id., amended by Act of April 28, 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 2601, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 130,
330. In this article, however, the name Guaranteed Student Loan Program will be
used. It is a federal program which provides assistance to students in securing low-
interest, long-term loans to help finance their postsecondary education. These loans
are not actually made by the federal government. Rather, they are obtained from
eligible private lenders and guaranteed by the government. See also BACKGROUND PA-
PER, supra note 2, at 1; Naegele, supra note 8, at 599-600; UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN INFORMATION SYSTEM NEEDS
A THOROUGH REDESIGN TO ACCOUNT FOR THE EXPENDITURE OF BILLIONS 1 (1981)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, the gov-
ernment pays interest to the lender on the insured student loans until the student's
repayment period begins. Id. The government pays each lender a quarterly special
allowance on the loan which is a percentage of the average unpaid principal balance
of all eligible loans held by the lender. Id. at 2. If the student defaults on a guaran-
teed loan and the lender cannot collect, the government pays the lender the principal
and interest due on the loan. The government is then left to recover the defaulted
student loan from the borrower. Id. Default occurs if the student borrower fails to
make the required loan repayments for at least 120 days (for a loan repayable in
monthly installments) or 180 days (for a loan repayable in less frequent installments).
See Skipping Out on Alma Mater: Some Problems Involving the Collection of Federal Student
Loans, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 317, 323 (1980).
10. See Jenkins, Regulation of Colleges and Universities Under the Guaranteed Student
Loan Programs, 4J.C. & U.L. 13, 15 (1976). As of March 1982, the National Commis-
sion on Student Financial Assistance reported that, since its inception under the
Higher Education Act of 1965, more than 18 million loans had been issued under the
Guaranteed Student Loan Program totalling nearly $30 billion. It was estimated that
during the 1981-82 school year alone, over 3 million students would borrow $8 bil-
lion. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
11. See Jenkins, supra note 10, at 15.
[Vol. 15
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early 1980s, to begin a campaign to crack down on defaulters.12
Despite the government's efforts to collect defaulted student
loans, the number of defaulters continues to grow. As of 1986, $4
billion to $5 billion was owed the federal government on defaulted
student loans.13 The dramatic growth in total annual loan volume
has resulted in large increases in loans entering repayment status
and becoming subject to default.t4 Due to the magnitude of these
costs and the current skyrocketing budget deficit, this "crisis" in stu-
dent loan defaults has been the object of growing scrutiny and con-
cern by the public and Congress.
This Case Note supports the Department of Education's authority
to use tax refund offsets to collect past-due, legally enforceable
debts. However, this Case Note challenges the recent Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Thomas v. Bennett,t 5 as well as the
court's interpretation of the statutes providing for the tax refund off-
set process. This Case Note will demonstrate that the court of ap-
peals erred when it held that the Department of Education has the
12. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 24. The increasing default rate led the
federal government to implement a series of remedies which included expanding the
number of government collection agents, using outside collection agencies, restrict-
ing the eligibility of institutions with abnormally high default rates, using credit bu-
reaus and IRS records to track down borrowers, and relying more heavily on state
guaranty agencies. The government also passed legislation to address the increasing
student default costs. See infra notes 17-30.
13. See Blodgett, supra note 1, at 22; Reuben, IRS To Join With Education Depart-
ment in Cracking Down on Delinquent Student Loans, 28 TAX NoTEs 713, 713 (1985); Han-
lon, supra note 1, at 971.
It was estimated that in 1988 alone, students would default on over $1.5 billion
in guaranteed student loans. Student Loan Defaults-The Belmont Task Force Report:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education &
Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988) (statement of Matthew G. Martinez, Congress-
man from California) [hereinafter Belmont Task Force Report].
14. See The Belmont Task Force Report, supra note 13, at 4. The Task Force partici-
pants noted that the increase in default costs are more likely attributable to increases
in loan volume rather than to increases in the default rate. Id. The Task Force stated
that because of the relationship between increases in value and increases in default
costs, such costs are likely to increase even more in the future. Id. Even with im-
proved collection methods, such as tax refund offsets, most defaulted student loans
are simply uncollectible because the defaulter is unemployed. The Task Force stud-
ied the type of people who are in default and concluded the following:
Contrary to popular perception, the typical defaulter is not a "deadbeat"
who refuses to pay, but appears to be a dropout who is unable to pay. De-
faulters tend to be first year students, from low income and minority back-
grounds, with a small loan balance (90 percent less than $5,000) who did
not complete more than the first year, have borrowed only once, receive no
or little assistance from parents in repaying, are likely to be unemployed
when the loan comes due, and never make a first payment ....
Id. at 10. Of course, some defaulters are "deadbeats" who can afford to repay their
student loans, but simply refuse to do so.
15. 856 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1988).
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authority, after the six-year statute of limitations has run, to use tax
refund offsets to collect defaulted student loans. 16
The first section of this Case Note provides background informa-
tion on Congress' response to increasing student loan defaults. It
also provides background on the courts' response to tax refund off-
sets. The second section sets forth the facts and the court's analysis
in Thomas v. Bennett. The third section is an analysis of the Thomas
decision. It examines the statutes of limitations for collection of a
debt owed to the federal government and the meaning of the phrase
"legally enforceable debt." The final section contains the author's
conclusions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Response to Student Loan Default Rate
On October 25, 1982, the Debt Collection Act17 became law. The
Act gives federal agencies the power to collect debts through several
processes such as attaching federal paychecks or retirement checks,
reporting .defaulted student loans to national credit bureaus, and
turning delinquent accounts over to the Justice Department for
prosecution.' 8
In attempting to collect on delinquent accounts, it was necessary
for the Justice Department to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). This
section states that: "every action for money damages brought by the
United States . . . which is founded upon any contract express or
implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed
within six years after the right of action accrues . 19. " 9
The Justice Department interpreted this statute to mean that "the
six year statute of limitations prevents the government from collect-
ing debts over six years old by means of offset."20 Thus, Congress
reasoned that "the government will be unable to collect a just debt
from many debtors because the statute of limitations has run out." 2 1
Regardless of the validity of the Justice Department's interpreta-
16. Id. at 1169 (emphasis added).
17. Debt Collection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365, 96 Stat. 1749 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 3711-19 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)). This Act gave federal agencies the power to collect unpaid debts owed to
the federal government by attaching various payments due and payable by the gov-
ernment to the debtor's in default. Id.
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PROGRAM BOOK: A SUMMARY OF 1984-85
PROGRAM STATIsTIcs B-4 (1986) [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PRO-
GRAM BOOK].
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20. S. REP. No. 378, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 16, reprinted in, 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3377, 3392.
21. Id.
[Vol. 15
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/12
INCOME TAX REFUND OFFSET
tion, Congress added 28 U.S.C. § 2415(i)22 to the Debt Collection
Act in response to this interpretation of the statute of limitations
found in section 2415(a).23 Section 2415(i) extends the statute of
limitations for certain administrative offsets to ten years. 24 Congress
also enacted 31 U.S.C. § 3716 which prescribes the procedures that
must be followed in order to use these offsets.25
Less than two years later, in 1984, Congress further expanded the
government's debt collection powers. Under the Deficit Reduction
Act,26 Congress provided for tax refund "offsets" by federal agen-
cies to collect debts owed to the federal government. 27 This tax re-
fund offset process was instituted pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3720A.28
The process allows any federal agency that is owed a "past-due le-
gally enforceable debt" to notify the Secretary of the Treasury to
intercept and offset the debtor's tax refund.29 The Deficit Reduction
Act also amended section 6402 of the Internal Revenue Code to au-
thorize tax refund offsets.3O
This tax refund offset process appears to be a cost effective
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(i) (1982).
23. Rigg, Interception of Tax Refunds to Offset Debts Owed Federal Agencies: Part Ill, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 822, 823 (1986) [hereinafter Rigg III].
24. Id.
25. Id. at 824.
26. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified at
26 U.S.C. § 6402 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 31 U.S.C. § 3720A (Supp. IV 1986)).
Section 3720A allows federal agencies which are owed past-due legally enforceable
debts to refer debtors' names to the Internal Revenue Service for interception of
their tax refunds. Rigg I, supra note 1, at 558.
27. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PROGRAM BOOK, supra note 18, at B-5; Han-
lon, supra note 1, at 971.
28. Rigg III, supra note 23, at 824 & n.26.
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A (Supp. IV 1986).
In order to institute a tax refund "offset," the Department of Education provides
the Internal Revenue Service with a list of names of students who have defaulted on
their student loans. The IRS matches those names with names of taxpayers owed tax
refunds. The IRS, then, offsets the refunds up to the amount owed on the defaulted
student loans. Reuben, supra note 13, at 713. Under this process, a 60-day notice
letter must be mailed to the student loan defaulter explaining the nature of their
obligation and that their name will be sent to the IRS to offset any tax refunds, if they
fail to establish a repayment schedule. Id. The federal agencies may only contact the
IRS to offset tax refunds as a last resort. Quayle Bill Would Make Refund Offset Program
for Student Loans Permanent, 34 TAx NOTES 1220, 1220 (1987). Other collection meth-
ods such as referring loan defaulters to credit bureaus, offsetting the salaries of de-
faulters who are federal employees, and turning delinquent accounts over to the
Justice Department for prosecution must be employed first. Hanlon, supra note 1, at
971.
The constitutionality of the notice provision of the tax offset program is not ad-
dressed in this Case Note. For a thorough analysis challenging the constitutionality
of such a notice provision see Rigg, Intercept of Tax Refunds to Offset Debts Owed Federal
Agencies: Part 11, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 702 (1986) [hereinafter Rigg II].
30. 26 U.S.C. § 6402(d) (Supp. IV 1986); Use of Tax Refund Offsets to Collect Nontax
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method of collecting outstanding debts.3t In 1988 alone, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service collected $236 million from 456,489 delinquent
debtors.32 The tax refund offset process, which was originally estab-
lished for a two-year trial period,33 has been extended to January 10,
1994.34
B. Judicial Response to Tax Refund Offset
Traditionally, the courts have supported the government's right to
exercise offset.35 For example, in Gratiot v. United States,3 6 the United
States Supreme Court stated that the government has the same right
that "belongs to every creditor, to apply the unappropriated moneys
of his debtor, in his hands, in extinguishment of the debts due to
him."3 7 In that case, the United States brought a lawsuit against
Gratiot to recover money he owed the government for wages paid to
him as chief engineer of the United States.5 8 The Supreme Court
held that the United States had the right to apply all money due to
Gratiot to offset and extinguish any balances he owed the United
States.39
Most of the cases decided prior to Thomas concerning debt collec-
tion by the government involve court action and not tax refund off-
set.40 The courts have consistently held in such cases that the six-
Federal Debts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985).
31. Over $400 Million Collected by the Tax Refund Offset Program in Last Two Years, 39
TAX NoTEs 320, 320 (1988). In the first year of its operation, the tax refund offset
program collected $150 million on delinquent debts owed to federal agencies. Tax
Refund Offset Program Nets $150 Million in Overdue Debts, 34 TAX NoTEs 834, 834 (1987).
32. Jones, Refund Offset Program Collects $236 Million in 1988, 42 TAX NOTES 623,
623 (1989). During the three years it has been in operation (1985-88), the tax re-
fund offset process has recovered $841 million in delinquent debts owed to the fed-
eral government. Id. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget estimated
that total recoveries in the next five years will be $2.1 billion. Id.
33. Hanlon, supra note 1, at 971.
34. Jones, supra note 32, at 623.
35. See, e.g., Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 140 (1962) (citing
United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947)); United States v. Munsey
Trust Co., 332 U.S. at 239-40; McKnight v. United States, 98 U.S. 179, 186 (1878);
Gratiot v. United States, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336, 370 (1841); IML Freight v. United
States, 639 F.2d 676, 679 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 585 F.2d
998, 1005 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Burlington N. Inc. v. United States, 462 F.2d 526, 529 (Ct.
Cl. 1972); Belgard v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. La. 1964); Western
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 422, 426 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
36. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336 (1841).
37. Id. at 370.
38. Id. at 337-38.
39. Id. at 370.
40. United States v. Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d 640 (11 th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Tilleraas, 709 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Frisk, 675 F.2d 1079 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Whitesell, 563 F. Supp. 1355 (D. S.D. 1983); United
[Vol. 15
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year statute of limitation established by 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)
governs .41
In Gerrard v. United States Office of Education,42 however, a District
Court in the Northern District of California addressed the tax refund
offset process. In Gerrard, a taxpayer brought an action against the
Department of Education to recover his tax refund which had been
intercepted by the Internal Revenue Service. 43 The offset had been
initiated more than six years after the government's right of action
had accrued. 44 The Gerrard court held that the six-year statute of
limitations, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a), did not apply to the tax
refund offset.45 In so holding, the court stated that section 2415
bars the government from bringing a civil action to enforce a debt,
but that the government has other lawful means of collecting the
debt such as administrative offset.46 The court in Gerrard further
held that "[t]he phrase 'legally enforceable' . . . does not mean 'not
barred by the statute of limitations.' "47
The Gerrard court's holding, however, misinterpreted 31 U.S.C.
§ 3716. It overlooked the fact that under section 3701(d) of title 31,
States v. Kendrick, 554 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ark. 1982); United States v. DeGusta, 512
F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Cal. 1981); United States v. Lucas, 516 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Tex.
1981); United States v. Lujan, 520 F. Supp. 282 (D. N.M. 1980); United States v.
Wilson, 478 F. Supp. 488 (M.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Dold, 462 F. Supp. 801
(D. S.D. 1978).
41. Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d at 634-44 ("[a]ctions brought by the United States seek-
ing money damages on account of a breach of contract are governed by a six year
statute of limitations"). Accord Tilleraas,'709 F.2d at 1090; Frisk, 675 F.2d at 1081;
Whitesell, 563 F. Supp. at 1358; DeGusta, 512 F. Supp. at 1300-01; Lucas, 516 F. Supp.
at 935; Dold, 462 F. Supp. at 805.
The courts, however, disagree as to when the six-year statute of limitations be-
gins to run. Some courts hold that the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as
the debtor defaults. See Dold, 462 F. Supp. at 805 (the statute began to run when the
defendant "defaulted" as the term is defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1080(e)(2)). Accord
DeGusta, 512 F. Supp. at 1301 ("[t]his court concurs in the Dold result"); see also Lucas,
516 F. Supp. at 935. The majority of courts, however, hold that the six-year statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the government pays the lender for the
defaulted loan. See Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d at 644 (the government's cause of action
accrues when the government pays the lender). Accord Tilleraas, 709 F.2d at 1092-93
(it was not until the government paid the Bank's claim that it obtained its right to
sue); Frisk, 675 F.2d at 1083 (the government's cause of action accrued when it paid
the lender); Whitesell, 563 F. Supp. at 1358 (the date it paid the defendant's delin-
quent obligation); Kendrick, 554 F. Supp. at 122; Lujan, 520 F. Supp. at 283; Wilson,
478 F. Supp. at 490.
42. 656 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id. at 573.
45. Id. According to the court, the use of the phrase "legally enforceable debt"
does not alter this analysis. Id. at 574.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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section 3716 does "not apply to a claim or debt under, or to an
amount payable under, the Internal Revenue Code ... "48 A tax
refund is such an amount. Moreover, the Gerrard court misinter-
preted the meaning of the phrase "legally enforceable." As this Case
Note later demonstrates, the phrase "legally enforceable" means not
barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations.
II. THE THOMAS DECISION
A. The Facts
Deborah Thomas brought an action challenging the authority of
the Secretary of the United States Department of Education, William
Bennett, to collect a defaulted federally guaranteed student loan
through an offset of her federal income tax refund after the statute of
limitations had expired.49 Thomas argued that since the statute of
limitations had run, the debt was no longer legally enforceable and
therefore not collectible by tax refund interception.50
In 1976, Deborah Thomas borrowed $825 from the Minnesota
State Student Loan Program to attend secretarial school at the Min-
neapolis Business College.5t The loan was federally guaranteed by
the Office of Education52 under the Federal Insured Student Loan
(FISL) Program. 53 Upon completion of the course, Thomas was un-
able to find a job and thus, was unable to repay her student loan.54
Subsequent collection efforts were unsuccessful.55 On February 8,
1978, the Office of Education paid the lender the balance due on
Thomas' student loan ($825 principal plus $48 accrued interest) pur-
suant to the terms of its insurance agreement. 56 The government
did not take any further action until 1985. At that time, the Secretary
of Education notified the Secretary of the Treasury of the defaulted
loan and requested that, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6402(d), any in-
48. 31 U.S.C. § 3701(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
49. Thomas v. Bennett, 856 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1988).
50. Brief for Appellant at 3, Thomas, 856 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1988)(No. 87-5273
MN).
51. Thomas, 856 F.2d at 1166.
52. The Office of Education was replaced by the Department of Education in
1980. At that time, "the Federal influence in education [had grown] large enough to
be the basis of a cabinet-level Department of Education, created by President
Carter .. " N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1985, at B7, col. 1. Thus, Deborah Thomas' 1976
loan was guaranteed by the Office of Education which has since become the Depart-
ment of Education.
53. Brief for Appellee at 5, Thomas, 856 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1988)(No. 87-5273
MN). The FISL program was established by Title IV, Part B of the Higher Education
Act of 1965, as amended, which is codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087-2.
54. Thomas, 856 F.2d at 1166.
55. Id.
56. Brief for Appellant, supra note 50, at 4.
(Vol. 15
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come tax refund due Thomas be offset against amounts owed on the
loan. 5 7 Thomas' entire 1985 refund was diverted to the Secretary of
Education and applied to the outstanding balance due on the loan.58
The same collection procedure was initiated in 1986 to collect the
balance, at which time Thomas filed suit against the Secretary of Ed-
ucation.59 Thomas asked for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Secretary of Education to prevent collection of the debt through
a tax refund offset.60 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota granted summary judgment for the Secretary of
Education, and Thomas appealed.61 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.62
B. The Court's Analysis
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Cir-
cuit Judge Beam, acknowledged that the six-year statute of limita-
tions had run, but reasoned that the expiration did not eliminate the
underlying debt.63 Therefore, the court of appeals held that
Thomas' student loan obligation remained a "legally enforceable
debt" which was properly subject to a tax refund offset.64
The Thomas court stated that expiration of the statute of limitations
does not terminate all of the government's rights to collect on a con-
tract claim after six years. 65 According to the court, the expiration of
this statutory period merely eliminates the remedy of filing a lawsuit
seeking money damages.66 In support of its position, the Thomas
court cited 28 U.S.C. § 2415(f) which provides that the limitation pe-
riod in section 2415(a) does not prohibit collecting the debt through
offset.67 In addition, the Thomas court quoted the Gerrard court, 68
57. Thomas, 856 F.2d at 1166.
58. Id. By the time of the offset, interest had accrued on Thomas' loan at a rate
of seven percent (the rate called for by the promissory note) through May, 1986 at
which time the amount owing was $1,359.21. Thomas' 1985 income tax refund of
$1,016.98 was credited against the account balance (less a processing fee of $3.78
paid to the IRS) leaving a remaining balance of $346.01. Brief for Appellee, supra
note 53, at 6.
59. Thomas, 856 F.2d at 1166.
60. Id. at 1166-67.
61. Id. at 1165.
62. Id. at 1169.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court of appeals further held that the district court had jurisdiction
in an action against the Secretary of Education challenging the validity of executing
an offset against a federal income tax refund. Id. at 1167.. In addition, the claims
were not made moot by the transfer of the fund at issue to the Secretary of Educa-
tion. Id. at 1168.
65. Id. at 1169.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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which stated that section 2415(a) bars the remedy of a civil action by
the government on a debt, but still allows other methods of collec-
tion.69 Although the government could no longer file a lawsuit
against Thomas because the six-year statute of limitations had run,
the court held that her obligation on the defaulted student loan re-
mained a "legally enforceable debt" under 26 U.S.C. § 6402(d), and
was properly subject to a tax refund offset.70 The Thomas court
adopted the view expressed in Gerrard that "[t]he phrase 'legally en-
forceable'. . . does not mean 'not barred by the statute of limita-
tions.' "71 As discussed earlier, the Gerrard court's holding is based
not only on a misinterpretation of the statutes which established the
tax refund offset process, but also, on a misinterpretation of the
phrase "legally enforceable." Thus, the Thomas court relied on a
case which itself was based on an incorrect interpretation of the ap-
plicable law. This reliance reinforces the argument that the decision
in Thomas was incorrect.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE THOMAS DECISION
A. Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations is governed by the statute which creates
it.72 It is the role of the state legislatures and Congress to enact spe-
cific statutes of limitations. "The purpose of a statute of limitations
is to promote justice, discourage unnecessary delay and forestall the
prosecution of stale claims." 7 The consequence of the expiration of
a statute of limitations is that the remedy provided by the statute is
forever barred. In addition, a statute of limitations enacted by a state
68. 656 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
69. Thomas, 856 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Gerrard, 656 F. Supp. at 574).
70. Thomas, 856 F.2d at 1169.
71. Id. (quoting Gerrard, 656 F. Supp. at 574).
72. See Uscienski v. National Sugar Ref. Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 240, 242, 18 A.2d 611,
612-13 (1941).
73. Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v.Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, 279,
599 P.2d 869, 872 (1979)(citing Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 369, 149 P.2d 372,
375 (1944)). According to the United States Supreme Court:
Statutes of limitations find their justification in necessity and convenience
rather than logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles....
They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate
between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable de-
lay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but
through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to
litigate.
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945)(citation omitted). The
Supreme Court stated in a more recent case that "[s]tatutes of limitations are not
simply technicalities. On the contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental
to a well-ordered judicial system." Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487
(1980).
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legislature or Congress supersedes any existing common law.74 In
regard to actions for money damages pursuant to a contract claim
brought by the United States, Congress has established a six-year
statute of limitations.75
As a general rule, a statute of limitations bars the remedy to which
it applies, but does not extinguish the right, obligation or cause of
action. 76 There are exceptions to this general rule. For example,
where the statute by its terms or by necessary implication extin-
guishes the right itself, the general rule does not apply.77 In addi-
74. The general rule states that there is no limitation period for the government
to bring an action unless a statute specifically authorizes it. S. REP. No. 1328, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8, reprinted in, 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2502, 2512.
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
76. See, e.g., Donaldson, 325 U.S. at 314; Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904);
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895); Osmundsen v. Todd Pac. Shipyard,
755 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1985); McClure v. Middletown Hosp. Assoc., 603 F.
Supp. 1365, 1369 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Industrial Comm'n of Colorado v. Weaver, 81
Colo. 1, 1, 254 P. 444, 445 (1927); State ex rel Anderson v. General Acc. Fire & Life
Assur. Corp., 134 Minn. 21, 24, 158 N.W. 715, 716 (1916); Glover v. National Bank
of Comm. of New York, 156 A.D. 247, 250-51, 141 N.Y.S. 409, 412 (1913); American
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 35 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 1931).
There is some authority, however, that contradicts this general rule. The United
States Supreme Court noted that "[s]ome are of opinion that like the analogous civil
law doctrine of prescription limitations statutes should be viewed as extinguishing
the claim and destroying the right itself. Admittedly it is troublesome to sustain as a
'right' a claim that can find no remedy for its invasion." Donaldson, 325 U.S. at 313
(footnote omitted).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the right as well as the remedy is
extinguished when the statute of limitations expires. See, e.g., Ginkowski v. Ginkow-
ski, 28 Wis. 2d 530, 536, 137 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1965)(extinguished the right and
remedy of annulment); Shaurette v. Capitol Erecting Co., 23 Wis. 2d 538, 544, 128
N.W.2d 34, 38 (1964)(statute could not operate retroactively so as to bar personal
injury action); First Nat'l Bank of Madison v. Kolbeck, 247 Wis. 462, 465, 19 N.W.2d
908, 909 (1945)(running of statute of limitations does not prevent foreclosure of
mortgage); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 393, 14 N.W.2d 177,
179 (1944)(running of statute of limitations absolutely extinguishes cause of action
even if treated as statute of repose). Similarly, the rule of law in New Jersey is that
the statute of limitations bars the right as well as the remedy. See Standard Oil Co. v.
NewJersey, 341 U.S. 428, 432 n.2 (1951)(citing State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281,
293, 74 A.2d 565, 571 (1950)). In Standard Oil, the NewJersey Supreme Court noted:
[I]t would seem that the destruction of the remedy reduces the "right" to a
mere moral obligation sufficient only in the law to sustain a new promise
without an independent consideration.... The abrogation of the remedy is
equally a violation of the right, for a right without a remedy is a mere
shadow.
Id.
77. See Greene v. Greene, 145 Miss. 87, 113, 110 So. 218, 223 (1926). The court
stated: "where the debt itself is extinguished by the statute of limitation, as it is in our
state, the account ceases to be a debt. It is completely extinguished by the statute of
limitation...." Id. See also Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis. 2d 127, 134, 254 N.W.2d 193,
197 (1977)(the running of the statute of limitations extinguishes the right as well as
the remedy).
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tion, where a statute of limitations gives a right of action or creates a
liability which did not exist at common law, and makes the time limi-
tation an essential element of the cause of action, the general rule is
inapplicable.78
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thomas correctly applied
this general rule and held that the statute of limitations bars the gov-
ernment from filing a lawsuit for money damages after six years, but
it does not extinguish the underlying debt.79 The Thomas court erro-
neously concluded, however, that the government could collect the
debt by a tax refund offset. Even with the passage of the Debt Col-
lection Act and the Deficit Reduction Act, no statute exists which
permits tax refund offsets more than six years after the cause of ac-
tion has accrued.S0 Section 2415(i) permits only non-tax administra-
tive offsets under 31 U.S.C. § 3716.81
Section 2415(i) provides that "[t]he provisions of this section shall
not prevent the United States or an officer or agency thereof from
collecting any claim of the United States by means of administrative
offset, in accordance with section 3716 of title 31."82 Section
3716(c)(2) states that "[t]his section does not apply.., when a stat-
ute explicitly provides for or prohibits using administrative offset to
collect the claim or type of claim involved."8 3 The synthesis of sec-
tions 2415(i) of title 28 and 3716(c)(2) of title 31 is that tax refund
offsets fall within the exception of section 3716(c)(2) when this sec-
tion is read in conjunction with 31 U.S.C. § 3701(d).
Section 3701(d) provides in part that sections "3716-3719 of this
title do not apply to a claim or debt under, or to an amount payable
under, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 1 et seq.)." 8 4
Tax refunds are an amount payable under the Internal Revenue
Code. This interpretation is confirmed by the legislative history of
the Debt Collection Act of 1982. Senate Report Number 378 states
that "[t]his revision to Section 2415 would allow administrative off-
set of delinquent debts owed the government against future pay-
ments benefits, or non-tax refunds due the delinquent debtor beyond
78. See, e.g., William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R., 268 U.S. 633,
636-37 (1925); Ray v. Sanitary Garbage Co., 134 Neb. 178, 183, 278 N.W. 139,
142-43 (1938)("limitation is a limitation of right as well as remedy")(citation
omitted).
79. Thomas v. Bennett, 856 F.2d 1165, 1169 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2415(f)).
80. Rigg III, supra note 23, at 824.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(i) (1982)(emphasis added). See 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (1982);
Rigg III, supra note 23, at 824.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(i) (1982).
83. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(2) (1982).
84. 31 U.S.C. § 3701(d)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See Rigg III, supra note 23, at
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the six-year statute of limitations." 8 5
Tax refund offset is authorized by section 3720A of title 31. This
section, however, does not state a specific period of limitation. In-
stead, it authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to "issue regula-
tions prescribing the time or times at which agencies must submit
notices of past-due legally enforceable debts .... "86 Pursuant to this
authorization, the Secretary of the Treasury has adopted a temporary
regulation which defines a "past-due legally enforceable debt" as
one "which... has been delinquent for at least three months but has
not been delinquent for more than ten years at the time the offset is
made."87 This regulation, however, does not have the full force of
law.88 Section 3720A(d) gives the Secretary of the Treasury the au-
thority to establish procedures for the submission of requests for off-
sets.89 It does not authorize the Secretary to define the statutory
terms,90 such as "legally enforceable," nor does it give the Secretary
of the Treasury the authority to extend the general six-year statute of
limitations established by Congress and codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2415(a). 91
It is undisputed that 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) establishes a six-year stat-
ute of limitations for the federal government to initiate a court action
against a defaulter. Once this statute of limitations expires, the gov-
ernment is barred from filing a lawsuit to collect the debt.
There is controversy surrounding the application of this six-year
limitation period to tax refund offsets since there is not a specified
statute of limitations for such an offset. Although the federal gov-
ernment has ten years to initiate a non-tax administrative offset this
does not apply to a tax refund offset. The key to the federal govern-
ment's ability to use a tax refund offset to collect a defaulted loan is
that the debt must be a "legally enforceable debt." The next section
of this Case Note will demonstrate that the six-year statute of limita-
tions found in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) applies to a tax refund offset.
B. Meaning of "Legally Enforceable Debt"
The applicable statutes require that debts be "past-due legally en-
forceable debts" in order to be subject to tax refund offset.92 The
85. S. REP. No. 378, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 17, reprinted in, 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3377, 3393 (emphasis added).
86. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
87. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-6T(b)(1) (1988).
88. Gerrard v. United States Office of Educ., 656 F. Supp. 570, 574 n.4 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
89. See 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
90. Gerrard, 656 F. Supp. at 574.
91. Rigg III, supra note 23, at 825.
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A (Supp. IV 1986) and 26 U.S.C. § 6402(d) (Supp. IV
1986).
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meaning of the phrase "legally enforceable" is not defined in any
statute or in the legislative history of the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984.93 Moreover, the case law is contradictory. Several courts hold
that a debt is legally enforceable even after the statute of limitations
has expired.94 Other courts hold that a debt is only "legally enforce-
able" within the statutory limitation period.95
Because the phrase "legally enforceable" is not defined by statute
or in the legislative history, it is assumed that "the congressional
purpose is expressed by the plain meaning of the statutory language
and the language must be considered conclusive."96 It is a firmly
established principle that in interpreting a statute, "its words are to
be taken according to the meaning given in common usage, in the
absence of an indication of a contrary intent or unless to do so would
defeat the purpose for which the Act was passed."9 7
In determining the meaning of "legally enforceable," the District
Court of Minnesota looked to the definitions of "legally" and "en-
force" in Black's Law Dictionary.98 In interpreting these definitions,
the district court concluded that "[t]hese definitions contemplate
that a 'legally enforceable debt' is a debt that is enforceable as a mat-
ter of substantive law."99 The district court, however, did not ex-
plain what it meant by "enforceable as a matter of substantive
law."too Moreover, the concept of "a debt that is enforceable as a
matter of substantive law" is logically inconsistent since substantive
law is separate and independent from enforcement issues.1O1 Never-
93. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 6402 and 31 U.S.C. § 3720A (Supp. IV 1986)). See Rigg III, supra note 23, at
825.
94. Thomas v. Bennett, 856 F.2d 1165, 1169 (8th Cir. 1988); Gerrard v. United
States Office of Educ., 656 F. Supp. 570, 574 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Atwater v.
Roudebush, 452 F. Supp. 622, 632 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
95. See, e.g., Grace Line, Inc. v. United States, 255 F.2d 810, 813 (2d Cir. 1958);
Hurst v. United States Dep't of Educ., 695 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (D. Kan. 1988); Fly-
ing Tiger Line, Inc. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 422, 426 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
96. Arkansas v. Block, 825 F.2d 1254, 1258 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing American To-
bacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982)).
97. Bruhn's Freezer Meats, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 438 F.2d 1332,
1338 (8th Cir. 1971).
98. Memorandum and Order of District Court at 5, Thomas v. Bennett, 856 F.2d
1165 (8th Cir. 1988) (No. 3-86-1027) (found in Addendum to Brief for Appellant).
The definitions relied upon by the court are the following:
"Legally. Lawfully, according to law." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 805 (5th ed.
1979).
"Enforce. To put into execution; to cause to take effect; to make effective; as, to
enforce a particular law, a writ, a judgment, or the collection of a debt or fine; to
compel obedience to. See e.g. Attachment; Execution; Garnishment." Id. at 474.
99. Memorandum and Order, supra note 98, at 5.
100. Id. Brief for Appellant, supra note 50, at 28.
101. Brief for Appellant, supra note 50, at 29-30.
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theless, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thomas apparently
adopted the district court's interpretation of the phrase "legally en-
forceable debt" without question. However, the district court's in-
terpretation is clearly unsupported by the standard definitions of
these terms.
The definition of "enforce" strongly implies the use of judicial ac-
tion as an element of enforceability. This definition uses the phrase
"putting into execution," which assumes an ability to sue and secure
a judgment.10 2 The phrase "legally enforceable" is not defined in
Black's Law Dictionary. The phrase "legally determined," however, is
defined as "determined by process of law."1to It can be argued,
therefore, that the definition of "legally enforceable" means enforce-
able by process of law. For a definition of "process of law," Black's
Law Dictionary provides a cross-reference to the definition of "due
process of law."t04 The definition of "due process of law" is "[1]aw
in its regular course of administration through courts ofjustice."105
Thus, the phrase "legally enforceable debt" means a debt which is
enforceable by the courts through the filing of a lawsuit. Therefore,
once the statute of limitations has expired on bringing an action, the
debt is no longer "legally enforceable."
At least one court decision, Hurst v. United States Department of Edu-
cation,106 decided seven days after the Thomas decision, confirms this
interpretation of the phrase "legally enforceable."107 In Hurst, the
District Court of Kansas held that "[i]n its most basic sense, 'legally
enforceable' means that a party could go to court and obtain ajudg-
ment on the debt."108
Before Hurst was decided, some court decisions relied on the defi-
nition of the phrase "past-due legally enforceable debt" promul-
gated in a temporary regulation 09 issued by the Secretary of the
Treasurv.llo As mentioned in a previous section of this Case Note,
however, such a regulation does not have the full force of law.I,
The definition of the phrase "legally enforceable" in Hurst has the
full force of law and, therefore, should have greater persuasive force
than the definition established by the Secretary of the Treasury.
102. Id. at 29.
103. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 98, at 806 (citing Black Diamond S.S.
Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 33 F.2d 767, 769 (D. Md. 1929)).
104. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98, at 1085.
105. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
106. 695 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Kan. 1988).
107. Id. at 1139.
108. Id.
109. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-6T(b)(1),(2) (1988).
110. See Thomas v. Bennett, 856 F.2d 1165, 1169 n.4 (8th Cir. 1988); Gerrard v.
United States Office of Educ., 656 F. Supp. 570, 574 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
111. Gerrard, 656 F. Supp. at 574 n.4.
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CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thomas incorrectly held
that a debt was "legally enforceable" after the six-year statute of lim-
itations had expired. Although the debt that Thomas owed the gov-
ernment on her defaulted student loan was a legal debt, it was no
longer a "legally enforceable debt" at the time the government offset
her tax refund.
Section 2415(a) of title 28 provides that every action for monetary
damages brought by the federal government, pursuant to a contract
claim, is barred unless a complaint is filed within six years after the
right of action accrues. Therefore, the government only has six
years to institute legal action against the defaulter to collect on the
debt. This statute of limitations, however, appears to apply only to
court action since it does not bar the government from executing
certain administrative offsets.
Section 2415(i) extended this six-year period to ten years for non-
tax administrative offsets. Non-tax administrative offsets may be ini-
tiated by the government to collect debts for a period of ten years
after the cause of action accrues. This is allowed even though the
debt is no longer a "legally enforceable debt" because it is still a
legal debt. However, this ten-year statute of limitations does not ap-
ply to tax refund offsets.
Authority for the tax refund offset process is contained in 31
U.S.C. § 3720A and 26 U.S.C. § 6402(d). Although neither of these
statutes explicitly provides a statute of limitations, they both man-
date that the debt be a "past-due legally enforceable debt" to be sub-
ject to the tax refund offset. The phrase "legally enforceable debt"
means a debt collectible through judicial process. Once the six-year
statute of limitations for bringing a court action expires, it follows
that the debt is no longer a "legally enforceable debt." Therefore,
after six years, the federal government can no longer use the tax re-
fund offset as a means for collecting the defaulted loan amount.
The statutes which provide for tax refund offset, 26 U.S.C.
§ 6402(d) and 31 U.S.C. § 3720A, clearly restrict the scope of the
government's interception power to "past-due legally enforceable
debts."112 The use of this phrase was intentional. Congress could
have simply used the word "debt," but instead it chose to use the
phrase "legally enforceable debt." This phrase is only found in sec-
tion 6402(d) of title 26 and section 3720A of title 31. The repetitive
use of this phrase in both sections strongly indicates that it has a
112. In 31 U.S.C. § 3720A, the phrase "past-due legally enforceable debt" is used
three times. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A (Supp. IV 1986). The repeated use of this phrase
suggests that it was inserted deliberately and with meaning. Brief for Appellant at 7,
Thomas v. Bennett, 856 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5273 MN).
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special meaning and was inserted deliberately.' 13
In Thomas, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation of
section 3720A allowed the federal government to use the tax refund
offset against Thomas despite the expiration of the applicable six-
year statute of limitations. This interpretation renders the statutory
phrase "legally enforceable debt" meaningless. It is a well-estab-
lished principle that a statute should be interpreted so as to give ef-
fect to all of its provisions and not to render any of them
superfluous.114 The Thomas court's decision not only violates this
principle, but it also disregards the applicable six-year statute of limi-
tations.
Trudy K Sternad
113. Id.
114. See Conway County Farmers Ass'n v. United States, 588 F.2d 592, 598 (8th
Cir. 1978); Brief for Appellant at 32.
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